NEWSROOM – Nordic Nations Join to Fend Off Moscow

Wall Street Journal

By Sune Engel Rasmussen

22 April 2025

For a long time, the Nordic countries were better known for their peace efforts and cozy living than militarism.

Now, they are shedding that persona. The Nordics have emerged as a model for Europe’s defense. They are leading efforts to reverse decades of military drawdowns to counter both Russian aggression and uncertain security guarantees from the Trump White House.

The four main Nordic countries are among Europe’s top donors of military aid to Ukraine by population, and have taken steps to usher in a new regional security architecture that’s less reliant on the U.S.

Any Nordic country would struggle to militarily square up to Russia on its own. But combined, the Nordics have an economy about the size of Mexico’s, and nearly the same size as Russia’s. Following Sweden and Finland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they have pooled some of their forces.

Sweden boasts an advanced defense industry that makes submarines, battle tanks and supersonic jet fighters. Norway possesses maritime surveillance and fighting capabilities in the Arctic. Finland has one of the largest standing armies and artillery forces per capita in Europe. And Denmark’s special forces have decades of experience deploying to some of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan and Iraq to fight American wars. (The fifth Nordic country, Iceland, has no standing army or defense industry).

“You have a regional grouping with the economic and resource potential to develop a fully integrated defense-industrial base like Germany has, but with a completely different kind of threat perception and political will,” said Eric Ciaramella, senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank and former senior U.S. intelligence analyst.

The Nordics share historic cultural bonds. In the Middle Ages, Scandinavian Vikings colonized and marauded throughout Europe, even reaching North America. For centuries after, the Nordic countries fought bloody wars among themselves, with regional powers Denmark and Sweden fighting over territory and beheading each other’s nobilities in town squares. Later, in a more conciliatory gesture, Sweden let the Nobel Peace Prize be awarded in Norway, even after the two countries dissolved their union in 1905.

Now, the shared Nordic view of Russia as a serious future threat has pulled those countries closer together than at any point in modern history. A recent Danish intelligence assessment said Russia could start a major war against one or more European NATO countries within three to five years, a view that chimes more with the Baltic nations than other Western capitals.

“The Nordic countries have a unified security policy for the first time since the Kalmar Union in the 1400s,” said Jens Stoltenberg, the former NATO secretary-general who is now Norway’s finance minister. “They have recognized the importance of deepening their military cooperation in a way that we haven’t seen for several centuries.”

The Nordics have combined their air forces, establishing a Joint Nordic Air Command in 2023. Last year they set out a vision for common defense through 2030 under the Nordic Defense Cooperation, or Nordefco.

To be sure, the Nordics are compensating for decades of disarmament following the end of the Cold War. The need to rearm has only grown amid Europe’s fading trust in the U.S. as a reliable ally under President Trump.

Nowhere is this realization felt more acutely than in Copenhagen, which is on the front line of Europe’s confrontation with Trump after he threatened to annex Greenland, a Danish territory. Denmark’s protection of the Arctic island, which is three times the size of Texas, relies largely on seven aging vessels so denuded of weapons and sensors that they barely count as warships, and about a dozen elite soldiers pulled on sleds by dogs.

Denmark’s decision in February to raise military spending by 70% over the next two years — including in Greenland — was “an expression of panic,” said Peter Viggo Jakobsen, associate professor at the Royal Danish Defence College.

“Denmark is up against the clock because we have lost faith in the Americans. The reason we have thrown ourselves into Nordic cooperation with such vigor is that we can’t protect ourselves. And if NATO can’t do it, the Nordics are an alternative,” Jakobsen said.

Identity shift

While the Nordics’ call to arms may clash with their global image, it has been long under way.

Finland has one of Europe’s largest armed forces per capita. It can mobilize 280,000 troops in weeks, and nearly one in six Finns, or about 900,000, are reservists. Underground shelters across the country can house roughly the remainder of the population. Finland is now contemplating withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention, which bans antipersonnel land mines.

Sweden is an engine of military innovation. JAS 39 Gripen jet fighters, designed to operate on short runways and counter Russian aircraft, participated in a NATO surveillance mission for the first time in March. Sweden’s Stridsvagn 122 is one of the world’s most advanced battle tanks, and its CV90 is one of the best infantry fighting vehicles.

Finland and Sweden both have mandatory conscription. In Sweden, military service is gender-neutral and highly selective, making it an elite pursuit. While other European countries struggle to boost their ranks, Sweden’s armed forces turn away thousands of young people each year.

Norway, long criticized for underspending despite sitting on the world’s largest sovereign-wealth fund of $1.5 trillion while profiting from energy prices pushed up by the Ukraine war, recently announced a doubling of its support for Kyiv, to more than $8 billion in 2025.

“It is a recognition that we need to do more to support Ukraine, but also that we need a fairer burden-sharing among NATO countries,” Stoltenberg said.

Denmark has become one of the loudest voices calling for European rearmament. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said in March that she wouldn’t rule out housing nuclear weapons on Danish soil, a historic shift in stance. After donating all of its artillery to Ukraine, Copenhagen conceived of a plan to fund contracts between the Ukrainian government and the country’s cash-strapped defense firms to produce weapons tailored for its shifting battlefield needs — an approach dubbed ” the Danish model.”

Propping up Ukraine’s own defense industry is a sustainable way to add deterrence against Russia while the U.S. blocks Ukrainian membership of NATO, said Anna Wieslander, the Stockholm-based director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council think tank.

“Linking our defense industries together is a very strong signal,” she said.

Nordic paths may diverge in the future. For example, while Denmark and Sweden are willing to contribute troops to a peacekeeping force after a cease-fire in Ukraine, Finland, with its 830-mile border with Russia, would likely prefer to keep soldiers at home.

For now, a united Nordic bloc could serve as a model for other clusters of nations, such as around the Black Sea, said Matti Pesu, senior research fellow with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The model can also serve as an insurance policy for the future, if the trans-Atlantic alliance disintegrates under Trump, he said.

“It’s a potential Plan B if NATO doesn’t work,” Pesu said.

Trump’s April 9 executive order, “Modernizing Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base,” hits the right notes and endorses the right approaches. After decades of ever-new studies, commissions, and legislation to streamline the defense acquisitions process—followed by halting and sporadic Defense Department implementation—it is encouraging to see a commander-in-chief directly tell the Pentagon to get on with it.

The executive order recognizes that DOD has, for too long, failed to embrace fully the more flexible rules and tools it already has on the books. These include other transaction authorities, commercial solutions openings, and the Adaptive Acquisition Framework launched during the first Trump administration.

The order builds on Secretary Pete Hegseth’s March 6 memo, “Directing Modern Software Acquisition to Maximize Lethality,” which requires the Pentagon to make CSOs and OTAs the default acquisition mechanism for buying defense software, not the exception.

The order also takes aim at the 30-year-old Joint Capabilities and Integration Defense Systems—better known as JCIDS—for validating military requirements, which, combined with traditional Pentagon and Congressional budget cycles, usually takes an absurd number of years to get a new weapons capability approved and funded. In all, energetically implementing the order’s direction to “eliminate or revise any unnecessary supplemental regulations or any other internal guidance” should shrink the 1,500-page Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations to a fraction of its length.

Not mentioned in the order, but consistent with its spirit and direction, is the long-ignored Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which requires DOD to buy commercially available products using industry-standard contracting mechanisms—that is, fixed-price contracts. FASA has been the law of the land for more than 30 years, but has been rarely heeded, leaving the U.S. military with substandard IT and taxpayers with inflated bills. It has also effectively barred the door to many innovative software and hardware companies. The Pentagon’s enforcement of FASA for rapid access to commercial technologies would, in many cases, obviate the need to work around the current system via special pathways or novel authorities.

Combined with the bold reforms proposed in the FoRGED and SHIPS bills, we may be finally transforming the way our nation develops, funds, procures, produces, and sustains weapons of war. Using the capabilities of the commercial sector, where nearly all software innovation originates, is critical to that effort, as the defense secretary’s software acquisition memo recognizes.

Recently, the Pentagon has embraced AI from non-traditional commercial firms to great effect for intelligence, targeting, and other combat operations. However, its adoption has been much slower on the logistics side of the house.

In fact, too often DOD professionals who acquire bleeding-edge technologies for the warfighter do so using primitive spreadsheets, emails, conference calls, and other semi-manual processes; or, at best, a kludgy government IT deployment that falls far short of what a commercial developer would provide—or a commercial customer would tolerate.

Consequently, DOD program officers are in a constant state of playing catch-up, dealing with obsolete parts, supply chain gaps, and the near-impossible task of disintermediating foreign suppliers. For all the caveats about military systems being fundamentally different, there’s no tenable reason why the procurement and maintenance of defense equipment can’t be a lot closer to the way Caterpillar orchestrates its supply chain or Walmart restocks its shelves.